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IP NEUTRALITY AND BENEFIT SHARING FOR SEASONAL 




Currently, countries that share samples of influenza viruses with a 
global WHO network called GISRS can participate in IP and benefit-
sharing agreements over their samples only if those samples are 
considered potential pandemic triggers. Some key players in public health 
want to change that by extending those protections to seasonal flu viruses. 
Others argue that doing so will be problematic, by, for example, creating 
too much red tape for vaccine research and development or by destroying 
the progress that has already been made in creating GISRS. In this battle 
between WHO stakeholders, expanding the scope of IP and benefits 
agreements to seasonal flu virus-donating countries will satisfy both 
parties in the long term and save lives.  
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INTRODUCTION 
“I was on duty,” recalled James H. Wallace, “on Friday, September 13, 
1918, when I was assigned to a ward of ‘flu’ patients. [The flu] had struck 
the training station like a bomb and the 100,000 men there suddenly filled 
up the hospital′s 3,000-beds . . . . The death rate was unbelievable, over 100 
a day.”1 David Burke explained that his father “remembered that sometimes 
the railroad station at Fort Devens would be stacked with the coffins of 
recruits who had died from the flu.”2  
The deaths that these men describe all sprang from the largest flu 
pandemic of the modern age, which is marked in the annals of history as the 
 
 1. Jay McAuliffe, Dr. James H. Wallace, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, 
https://www.cdc.gov/publications/panflu/stories/warstories_wallace.html (last visited Oct. 27, 2016). 
 2.  David P. Burke, Paul J. Burke, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, 
https://www.cdc.gov/publications/panflu/stories/warstories_burke.html (last updated June 3, 2014) 
(quoting his father, Paul J. Burke). 
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Spanish flu.3 Although it is unknown where the pandemic started,4 it spread 
wildly through the ranks of soldiers fighting in the First World War.5 It is 
believed that “about one-third of the planet’s  population” was infected with 
the flu during that time and that “more U.S. soldiers died from the 1918 flu 
than were killed in battle during the war.”6 
Since that horrific pandemic, several other potent flu virus strains have 
swept across the globe and have taken their tolls on human life. In the 1950s, 
for example, one flu pandemic killed about two million people, while another 
in the 1960s claimed another million.7 Recently, from 2009 to 2010, another, 
commonly known as “swine flu,” killed 14,000.8 Experts predict that another 
flu pandemic is imminent.9  
In preparing for the next flu pandemic, policymakers and researchers 
around the world need to focus on an underestimated and strongly-related 
threat: seasonal flu.10 International seasonal flu surveillance keeps the flu 
vaccine industry alive between pandemic cycles, promotes the kind of 
technological innovation and network-building that prepares the world for 
pandemics, and helps mitigate the significant toll that seasonal flu takes on 
public health and the economy.11 
 
 3.  1918 Flu Pandemic, HISTORY, http://www.history.com/topics/1918-flu-pandemic (last visited 
Nov. 14, 2016) [hereinafter 1918 Flu Pandemic]. 
 4.  Jennifer Latson, What Made the Spanish Flu so Deadly?, TIME (March 11, 2015), 
http://time.com/3731745/spanish-flu-history/ (“Some researchers believe the story began on the morning 
of . . . Mar. 11, 1918, when a soldier in Fort Riley, Kans., went to the camp infirmary with a fever.”). 
 5.  Id.; 1918 Flu Pandemic, supra note 3. 
 6.  1918 Flu Pandemic, supra note 3. 
 7.  Id. 
 8.  Id.; Katherine Harmon, What Will the Next Influenza Pandemic Look Like?, SCIENTIFIC 
AMERICAN (Sep. 19, 2011), https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/next-influenza-pandemic/. 
 9.  See, e.g., Harmon, supra note 8. 
 10.  In many ways, seasonal flu is the overlooked step-sibling of pandemic influenza. It is common 
and rarely lethal. 
 11.  For example, it is estimated that seasonal flu has killed just as many individuals over the last 
century as all of the major flu pandemics during the same time. Ab Osterhaus, Ron Fouchier & Guus 
Rimmelzwaan, Towards Universal Influenza Vaccines?, 366 PHIL. TRANS. R. SOC. B. 2766, 2766 (2011). 
Amazingly, by one estimate, there have been more deaths from seasonal flu even in specific years than 
from individual flu pandemics. Peter Doshi, Trends in Recorded Influenza Mortality: United States, 
1900–2004, 98 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH, 939, 941 (2008) (“For example, the 1941–1942, 1942–1943, 1943–
1944, 1944–1945, 1945–1946, 1946–1947, and 1952–1953 nonpandemic seasons were all deadlier than 
the 1957–1958 pandemic season.”). While there is some controversy surrounding the statistical modeling 
of seasonal flu deaths, the debate over how best to model those deaths is beyond the scope of this paper. 
Id. at 943. Even in its mildest form, seasonal flu often leads to medical visits, missed days of work and 
lower work productivity among a large segment of the population, costing consumers and businesses 
billions of dollars every year. See Noelle-Angelique M. Molinari et al., The Annual Impact of Seasonal 
Influenza in the US: Measuring Disease Burden and Costs, 25 VACCINE 5086, 5093 tbl.5 (2007). 
 
  
2018 AN ARGUMENT IN FAVOR OF WHO PIP FRAMEWORK EXPANSION 299 
 
Unfortunately, despite its potential benefits, seasonal flu research is 
arguably partially dis-incentivized in international legal agreements. More 
specifically, under a global research program run by the World Health 
Organization (WHO), certain intellectual property safeguards only extend to 
pandemic influenza viruses that are donated to its research network—not to 
donated seasonal viruses.12 In May 2017, the World Health Assembly 
adopted a decision that requires the Director General to study whether or not 
to extend that framework, but it is unclear how long that will take.13 And 
while there has at least been active debate in the area, with some participants 
in support of the initiative14 and some against,15 one of the most important 
perspectives to hear in this discussion about intellectual property—that is, an 
intellectual property perspective—does not seem to have voiced a strong 
opinion in the matter. 
Some evidence suggests that attorneys have been influencing WHO 
discussions on this topic from the inside, a possibility that has worried some 
scientists who fear that attorneys have anti-public health biases.16 These fears 
have some basis in reality: public health and intellectual property are 
sometimes viewed as enemies or, at best, awkward allies in global 
development work.17  
However, not all intellectual property law perspectives run against 
public health.18 The IP perspective offered in this article is based on the 
 
Moreover, if seasonal flu mutates into a form that the human immune system cannot fight, it may spread 
in pandemic-like fashion. See How the Flu Virus Can Change: “Drift” and “Shift,” CTRS. FOR DISEASE 
CONTROL & PREVENTION, http://www.cdc.gov/flu/about/viruses/change.htm (last visited Feb. 25, 2018). 
 12.  See Catherine Saez, WHO Debates Expansion of Role In Virus-Sharing, INT. PROP. WATCH 
(Aug. 31, 2016), http://www.ip-watch.org/2016/08/31/who-debates-expansion-of-role-in-virus-sharing/. 
 13.  IMPLEMENTATION OF DECISION WHA70(10) 8(B): QUESTIONS & ANSWERS, WHO 3, 9 (2017). 
The Director-General will issue a report on this study in May of 2018. Id. At 9. See generally REPORT OF 
THE 2016 PIP FRAMEWORK REVIEW GROUP, REVIEW OF THE PANDEMIC INFLUENZA PREPAREDNESS 
FRAMEWORK, WORLD HEALTH ORG., (Dec. 29, 2016), 
http://apps.who.int/gb/ebwha/pdf_files/EB140/B140_16-en.pdf?ua=1. 
 14.  Saez, supra note 12. 
 15.  Id.; see generally discussion infra. 
 16.  Catherine Saez, WHO Flu Pandemic Framework Working, Group Says; Some Concerned, INT. 
PROP. WATCH (Aug. 30, 2016), https://www.ip-watch.org/2016/08/30/who-flu-pandemic-framework-
working-group-says-others-concerned/. 
 17.  See, e.g., Susan K. Sell, The Quest for Global Governance in Intellectual Property and Public 
Health: Structural, Discursive, and Institutional Dimensions, 77 TEMP. L. REV. 363, 363 (2004). 
 18.  Generally, intellectual property perspectives need to take both business and scientific interests 
into account, but in the virus and vaccine context, for example, some scholars may be split over what kind 
of “science” is valuable in intellectual property policy considerations. Some may support the 
advancement of the science behind improved vaccine-related technologies but not find as much value in 
the science behind public health, which is also critical in vaccine discussions. 
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simple premise that when people are healthy, they can devote less time to 
sickness and more time to education, family, and work: a phenomenon 
which, on a large scale, could translate into gains in economy, trade, and 
innovation. The purpose of this paper is to provide an analysis of the seasonal 
flu network debate through this pro-public health intellectual property lens 
and explain how extending WHO contractual protection to seasonal flu 
viruses can protect scientific innovation, public health, and business interests 
in the long run. 
In order to make this argument that WHO’s viral exchange legal 
protections should extend to seasonal flu viruses, I will provide an 
introduction to seasonal flu and describe its effect on global health and 
economy in Part II. I will then discuss the structure of WHO’s virus network 
and the legal protections that the program provides to pandemic flu virus 
donor countries in Part III. In Part IV, I will analyze the policy debate on 
extending that protection to seasonal virus donor countries and explain why 
the extension arguments are stronger. In Part V, I will discuss considerations 
that the WHO should take into account if it does eventually decide to extend 
legal protection to seasonal flu. In Part VI, I will conclude. 
I. AN INTRODUCTION TO SEASONAL FLU 
In a 2015 flu shot commercial, an office birthday party is depicted in 
which a middle-aged male employee is told to make a wish before blowing 
out birthday candles.19 He does so and then proceeds to involuntarily cough 
and sneeze all over the top of the cake.20 His act leaves his cake-loving co-
worker in a quandary over whether or not she should eat a slice.21 
This comical portrayal of seasonal flu illustrates a hyperbolic, but 
perhaps, partially accurate, American perception of this illness: no one wants 
to get the flu, but a germ-infested cake might be worth the risk. This 
sentiment toward the flu makes sense, of course: for the majority of 
Americans, the seasonal flu that comes around every winter may necessitate 
a few weeks of bed rest, but the experience is rarely life-threatening. 
 
 19.  See Rite Aid TV Commercial, ‘Janet Loves Cake’, ISPOT.TV (Dec. 12, 2015), 
https://www.ispot.tv/ad/AkDL/rite-aid-janet-loves-cake (last visited Feb. 19, 2018). 
 20.  Id. 
 21.  Id. 
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Considering the low death rate22 attributable to seasonal flu and the attitude 
that the general American population has toward it, then, it is important to 
understand what seasonal influenza is and how it impacts health. 
A. An Epidemiological Snapshot of Seasonal Influenza 
Seasonal influenza is an extremely common illness. According to one 
estimate, seasonal influenza spreads to about a quarter of all children and 
five to ten percent of adults every year.23 The spread of this illness, which is 
caused by a contagious virus, peaks in winter in colder climates and 
experiences more sporadic cycles in warmer climates.24 Seasonal influenza 
has a stronger effect on vulnerable populations, including pregnant women, 
the elderly, children, and individuals with serious health conditions.25  
B. The Influenza Virus 
Seasonal influenza is caused by invasive packaged genetic material, 
also known as a virus.26 When flu viruses enter the human body, they use 
host cells to replicate themselves27 and can contribute to host cell self-
destruction.28 Between losing cells and experiencing the activation of their 
own immune systems,29 flu sufferers start to feel the effects of a flu virus 
invasion in short order: fever, sore throat, headaches and muscle aches, for 
example.30 
 
 22.  CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, Seasonal Influenza, More Information, 
http://www.cdc.gov/flu/about/qa/disease.htm#people (last updated Oct. 12, 2017) (“[I]n the United States 
[generally,] millions of people become ill, hundreds of thousands are hospitalized and thousands or tens 
of thousands of people die from flu every year.”). 
 23.  World Health Org., H5N1 Avian Influenza: First Steps Towards Development of a Human 
Vaccine, 33 WKLY. EPIDEMIOLOGICAL REC. 277, 281 (Aug. 19, 2005), 
http://www.who.int/wer/2005/wer8033.pdf. 
 24.  Influenza (Seasonal), WORLD HEALTH ORG., 
http://www.who.int/mediacentre/factsheets/fs211/en/ (last updated Jan. 2018). 
 25.  Id. 
 26.  Peter M. Crosta, Viruses: An Introduction, MED. NEWS TODAY (July 11, 2016), 
http://www.medicalnewstoday.com/articles/158179.php. 
 27.  Craig Freudenrich, How Viruses Work, HOWSTUFFWORKS SCI. (Oct. 19, 2000), 
http://science.howstuffworks.com/life/cellular-microscopic/virus-human3.htm. 
 28.  See generally S. Tripathi et al., Influenza A Virus Nucleoprotein Induces Apoptosis in Human 
Airway Epithelial Cells: Implications of a Novel Interaction Between Nucleoprotein and Host Protein 
Clustering, 4 CELL DEATH & DISEASE 562 (2013). 
 29.  See Freudenrich, supra note 27. 
 30.  Key Facts About Influenza (Flu), CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREV., 
http://www.cdc.gov/flu/keyfacts.htm (last accessed Oct. 13, 2016). 
 
  
302 CHICAGO-KENT JOURNAL OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY Vol 17:2 
 
In expelling the flu virus from one’s system, an individual may, 
naturally, cough or sneeze,31 sending virus particles hurtling toward other 
individuals who, then, will similarly have to fight off viral invasion.32 The 
severity of that invasion will depend on the virus’ interplay with the human 
immune system: when a virus is weak or the immune system is strong, viral 
spreading will do little damage. However, for some individuals with weak 
immune systems, the flu virus can cause deadly complications, like 
pneumonia.33 For the same reason, people in many lower- and middle-
income countries, where nutrition and healthcare are less-readily accessible, 
are susceptible to seasonal flu.34 
When a virus mutates in a way that the human immune system cannot 
defeat, that virus has more lethal potential.35 Viruses that shift from animal 
species to human species, for example, are said to have this potential because 
human immune systems are not used to their mode of operation.36 In cases 
like these, especially strong flu viruses can cause international disease 
outbreaks, also known as pandemics.37 
The primary difference then, between seasonal and pandemic influenza 
is, in some ways, just a matter of degree. It is true that some flu virus strains 
may be considered less prone to mutation than others.38 However, in theory, 
any virus can mutate radically into a form that humans cannot fight off, and 
this mutation can result in another Spanish flu.39 Consequently, it is of vital 
importance to monitor and research as many viral strains as possible. 
 
 31.  Freudenrich, supra note 27. 
 32.  Key Facts About Influenza (Flu), supra note 30. 
 33.  Id. 
 34.  See Influenza (Seasonal), supra note 24. 
 35.  See How the Flu Virus Can Change: “Drift” and “Shift”, supra note 11. 
 36.  See Transmission of Influenza Viruses from Animals to People, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL 
& PREVENTION, http://www.cdc.gov/flu/about/viruses/transmission.htm (last updated Aug. 19, 2014) 
(“Antigenic shift results when a new influenza A subtype to which most people have little or no immune 
protection infects humans. If this new virus causes illness in people and can spread easily from person to 
person, an influenza pandemic can occur.”). 
 37.  What is a Pandemic?, WORLD HEALTH ORG. (Feb. 24, 2010), 
http://www.who.int/csr/disease/swineflu/frequently_asked_questions/pandemic/en/. 
 38.  See generally Eri Nobusawa & Katsuhiko Sato, Comparison of the Mutation Rates of Human 
Influenza A and B Viruses, 80 J. VIROLOGY 3675 (2006). 
 39.  See supra Part I. 
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C. The Influenza Vaccine 
Seasonal flu viruses can be used to produce flu vaccines, which are a 
primary prevention tool used to combat the flu. If a viral infection could be 
considered a test of an immune system’s strength, a vaccine could be 
considered a practice exam. Vaccines often consist of toxins or weakened, 
partial, or dead viruses that the body can learn to fight against without the 
threat of being taken over.40 Once the immune system learns to fend off a 
certain viral strain, that knowledge sticks with the immune system: a 
knowledge that enables it to quickly conquer the actual virus upon 
invasion.41 
Vaccination has been called “the most cost-effective way to reduce [the 
seasonal flu] disease burden,”42 and due to the impact that vaccination has 
on population health, vaccine use boosts the economy as well. After all, the 
flu vaccine prevents deaths and hospitalizations, but it also reduces lost work 
days.43 According to one estimate, if 75% of individuals recommended to 
receive the seasonal flu vaccine in twenty-seven European countries actually 
did so, 1.6 to 1.7 million more individuals would avoid the flu, about 10,000 
deaths would be avoided, and about a million lost days of work would be 
recouped.44 Such public health gains would translate to an estimated €200 
million in combined annual savings.45 
D. Seasonal influenza antiviral drugs 
Seasonal influenza viral material can also be used to develop antiviral 
drugs. The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) views 
antiviral drugs as “a second line of defense to treat [seasonal] flu.”46 While 
a flu shot prevents an individual from developing the flu, antiviral drugs can 
 
 40.  CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, UNDERSTANDING HOW VACCINES WORK 1–2 
(2013), https://web.archive.org/web/20150213181503/http://www.cdc.gov/vaccines/hcp/patient-
ed/conversations/downloads/vacsafe-understand-color-office.pdf.  
 41.  See id. 
 42.  Osterhaus, Fouchier & Rimmelzwaan, supra note 11, at 2766. 
 43.  PREAUD ET AL., ANNUAL PUBLIC HEALTH AND ECONOMIC BENEFITS OF SEASONAL INFLUENZA 
VACCINATION: A EUROPEAN ESTIMATE 1, 8 (2014), 
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4141103/pdf/12889_2013_Article_6962.pdf. 
 44.  Id. 
 45.  Id. 
 46.  What You Should Know About Flu Antiviral Drugs, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & 
PREVENTION (last updated Aug. 11, 2016), http://www.cdc.gov/flu/antivirals/whatyoushould.htm. 
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shorten the duration of sickness and make symptoms more bearable.47 In 
doing so, antiviral drugs, like vaccines, can contribute to public health gains 
and cost savings by decreasing sick days, hospitalizations, and deaths.48 
E. The impact of seasonal flu research on pandemic flu research 
By researching and developing seasonal flu vaccines and antivirals, of 
course, scientists do not simply protect populations from seasonal flu: they 
also prepare the world for pandemic flu by keeping vaccine manufacturers 
financially afloat and by advancing flu research generally. Kenneth McLean 
and colleagues explain that “[i]f influenza immunization rates stagnate or 
drop[,] this could result in manufacturers reducing or stopping their seasonal 
vaccine production [and] impact the global capacity for pandemic influenza 
vaccines.”49 In other words, deceasing seasonal flu vaccine sales could hurt 
pandemic flu preparedness both by reducing annual vaccine manufacturer 
profits and by slowing down flu research.  
Moreover, because seasonal influenza strains are similar to and could 
theoretically become pandemic strains through mutation,50 technologies that 
scientists develop around seasonal influenza often have direct application to 
pandemic flu. For example, WHO once listed a seasonal flu vaccine 
technology as one of the “most promising avenues for short and medium 
term development of pandemic influenza vaccines.”51 Without seasonal 
influenza research and technology, our level of pandemic flu preparedness 
could weaken significantly.  
II. WHO’S RESEARCH DATABASE 
It is in this context—knowing how similar seasonal and pandemic 
influenza truly are and how seasonal flu research can prepare the world for 
pandemic flu—that we approach the question of how WHO’s flu research 
system currently handles seasonal flu viruses.  
 
 47.  Id. 
 48.  See id. 
 49.  Kenneth A. McLean et al., The 2015 Global Production Capacity of Seasonal and Pandemic 
Influenza Vaccine, 34 VACCINE 5410, 5412 (2016). 
 50.  REVIEW OF THE PANDEMIC INFLUENZA PREPAREDNESS FRAMEWORK FOR THE SHARING OF 
INFLUENZA VIRUSES AND ACCESS TO VACCINES AND OTHER BENEFITS, PANDEMIC INFLUENZA 
PREPAREDNESS FRAMEWORK REVIEW GROUP, § 3.2.1 (2016) [hereinafter PIP FRAMEWORK REVIEW]. 
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Currently, the structure of WHO’s research network, also known as the 
Global Influenza Surveillance and Response System (GISRS), only provides 
certain legal protections to countries that donate flu virus strains with 
“pandemic potential.”52 Before delving into the debate on whether or not 
seasonal flu should also receive these protections, I will discuss the origins 
of this system and how it currently operates. 
A. GISN and the Indonesian Avian Flu Revolt of 2007 
The international flu monitoring system we know today as the GISRS 
has been in existence since 1952, although it was originally called the Global 
Influenza Surveillance Network, or GISN.53 The purpose of this system is to 
monitor virus mutations and alert global leaders when pandemics are likely 
to occur.54 The system operates in part by bringing seasonal and pandemic 
flu virus strains from around the world to WHO-affiliated labs and 
manufacturers, who conduct research on these strains and then develop 
vaccines and antivirals to combat them.55  
Although the network operated successfully for over half a century, an 
incident related to Avian flu in 2007 created a need for GISN overhaul. 
During that year, the nation of Indonesia withheld one of its Avian flu strains 
from WHO’s flu database, choosing instead to work with a pharmaceutical 
company to produce a vaccine for it.56  
The nation explained that it was doing so in part because it was angry 
with WHO.57 According to one report, “Indonesia blamed the World Health 
Organization . . . for the government’s decision to stop sharing samples of 
the H5N1 bird flu virus, claiming that the United Nations agency passed 
 
 52.  Global Influenza Surveillance and Response System (GISRS), WORLD HEALTH ORG., 
http://www.who.int/influenza/gisrs_laboratory/en/ (last visited Feb. 15, 2018). 
 53.  Id.; TERMS OF REFERENCE FOR NATIONAL INFLUENZA CENTERS OF THE GLOBAL INFLUENZA 
SURVEILLANCE AND RESPONSE SYSTEM, WORLD HEALTH ORG. 1 (2017), 
http://www.who.int/influenza/gisrs_laboratory/national_influenza_centres/tor_nic.pdf. 
 54.  Global Influenza Surveillance and Response System (GISRS), supra note 52. 
 55.  WHO Global Influenza Surveillance and Response System (GISRS) Surveillance and Vaccine 
Development, WHO COLLABORATING CNTR. FOR REFERENCE & RES. ON INFLUENZA, 
http://www.influenzacentre.org/centre_GISRS.htm (last visited Feb. 15, 2018). 
 56.  David P. Fidler, Indonesia’s Decision to Withhold Influenza Virus Samples from the World 
Health Organization: Implications for International Law, ASIL INSIGHTS (Feb. 28, 2007), 
https://www.asil.org/insights/volume/11/issue/4/indonesias-decision-withhold-influenza-virus-samples-
world-health. 
 57.  Id. 
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them on to pharmaceutical companies to make vaccines that Jakarta had to 
buy at high prices.”58  
Two reactions emerged out of Indonesia’s radical move: one was fear 
that other countries might follow Indonesia’s lead and keep their viruses to 
themselves as “sovereign property.”59 Another was anger at WHO for 
turning the GISN network into a “virus vacuum:” taking viruses from poor 
countries and allowing wealthy industries to patent and/or profit from the 
results for free without giving back.60 After all, Indonesia’s experience was 
not an isolated incident. When Avian flu struck Mexico in 2009, wealthy 
countries took the virus strain that Mexico donated into vaccines and took 
care of their own populations before turning back to Mexico.61 In fact, 
although ninety-five WHO-partnering countries did not have a way to get 
vaccines on their own during that pandemic, only two received WHO aid 
within ten months of the first reported cases.62  
So, really, the Indonesian Avian flu experience highlighted two major 
problems with the GISN: first, there was no intellectual property framework 
that regulated how viral material could be used by WHO laboratories or 
manufacturers, and second, there was little incentive for wealthy 
manufacturers to “give back” to donors in any way. 
B. The GISRS and the PIP Framework 
These kinds of experiences prompted negotiations between WHO and 
partner countries to overhaul the virus sharing network, with a dual focus on 
intellectual property ownership of viral resources and equitable sharing of 
benefits. As a result of these negotiations, WHO created a new legal model 
 
 58.  Id. (quoting John Aglionby & Andrew Jack, Indonesia Accuses WHO of Misusing Flu Sample, 
FIN. TIMES (Feb, 8, 2007, 2:00 AM), http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/e565960c-b719-11db-8bc2-
0000779e2340.html?ft_site=falcon&desktop=true#axzz4SrQvQzuW). 
 59.  Richard Holbrooke & Laurie Garett, ‘Sovereignty’ That Risks Global Health, WASH. POST 
(Aug. 10, 2008), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2008/08/08/AR2008080802919.html. 
 60.  See Edward Hammond, Indonesia Fights to Change WHO Rules on Flu Vaccines, GRAIN (Apr. 
18, 2009), https://www.grain.org/article/entries/761-indonesia-fights-to-change-who-rules-on-flu-
vaccines. 
 61.  Charles Lawson, Who Shall Live When Not All Can Live? Intellectual Property in Accessing 
and Benefit-Sharing Influenza Viruses Through the World Health Organisation, 18 J.L.M. 554, 574 
(2011). 
 62.  Id. (citing Chan Chee Khoon, Equitable Access to Pandemic Flu Vaccines, THIRD WORLD 
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for virus sharing in WHO’s flu database, also known as the Pandemic 
Influenza Preparedness (PIP) Framework,63 and changed its network name 
from GISN to the “Global Influenza Surveillance and Response System” 
(GISRS).64  
The main goal of this new PIP Framework was to improve GISRS65 by 
giving countries an assurance that they would be able to benefit in some way 
for sharing their viral information with WHO.66 As noted by WHO, “[t]he 
PIP Framework aims to improve . . . the [GISRS] so it is more fair, 
transparent, equitable, efficient, and effective in facilitating the sharing of 
influenza viruses with pandemic potential and [in] increasing . . . access to 
pandemic influenza vaccines and other benefits.”67 In order to build a more 
open-access virus community and support vaccine technology benefits 
sharing, the PIP Framework utilizes a contract system68 that prevents viral 
material from being patented and provides partner countries (or WHO 
generally) with certain benefits.69 This contract system operates through two 
separate agreements, also known as Standard Material Transfer Agreements 
1 and 2 (SMTAs 1 and 2).70  
SMTA 1 is an agreement made among WHO laboratories to facilitate 
open-access virus sharing.71 Under this agreement, laboratories that donate 
viruses to the network promise to handle those viruses according to 
established WHO and safety guidelines.72 In exchange, the laboratories that 
receive those viruses promise to involve donor laboratories in their research 
 
 63.  David P. Fidler & Lawrence O. Gostin, WHO Pandemic Influenza Preparedness Framework: 
A Milestone in Global Governance for Health, 306 JAMA 200, 200 (2011). 
 64.  Global Influenza Surveillance and Response System (GISRS), supra note 52. 
 65.  Fidler & Gostin, supra note 63, at 201 (describing the PIP Framework as improving the 
“legitimacy” of the system). 
 66.  Id. at 200. 
 67.  PANDEMIC INFLUENZA PREPAREDNESS FRAMEWORK FOR THE SHARING OF INFLUENZA 
VIRUSES AND ACCESS TO VACCINES AND OTHER BENEFITS (“PIP FRAMEWORK”): QUESTIONS AND 
ANSWERS, WORLD HEALTH ORG. 3 (Sep. 2011), 
http://www.who.int/influenza/pip/PIP_FQA_Nov_2011.pdf. [hereinafter WHO, PIP FRAMEWORK 
Q&A]. 
 68.  Fidler & Gostin, supra note 63, at 201. 
 69.  PANDEMIC INFLUENZA PREPAREDNESS FRAMEWORK Q&AS, WORLD HEALTH ORG. 3, 
http://www.who.int/influenza/pip/QA_Flyer.pdf (2016). 
 70.  PANDEMIC INFLUENZA PREPAREDNESS FRAMEWORK FOR THE SHARING OF INFLUENZA 
VIRUSES AND ACCESS TO VACCINES AND OTHER BENEFITS, WORLD HEALTH ORG. 29–32 (2011) 
[hereinafter WHO, PIP Framework]. 
 71.  Id. at 29–36. 
 72.  Id. at 30. 
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and acknowledge donor laboratories if that research leads to publishable or 
presentation-worthy scientific findings.73 Finally, both donors and recipients 
promise, very simply, that they will not “seek to obtain any intellectual 
property rights” on donated viral material.74 This agreement does not extend 
to IP rights obtained on material before the PIP Framework was adopted—
rather, those prior rights are left intact, and so are any IP-backed technologies 
involved in preparing donor material.75  
SMTA 2 is a benefit sharing agreement that WHO can make with non-
WHO entities, such as vaccine and antiviral manufacturers.76 Under the 
agreement, WHO gives a flu virus to a manufacturer in exchange for certain 
benefits.77 Manufacturers can choose which benefits they’d like to provide 
to WHO: some of the options include “donat[ing] at least 10% of real time 
pandemic vaccine production to WHO,” selling the same amount to WHO at 
low cost, or “[g]rant[ing] to manufacturers in developing countries licenses 
on mutually agreed terms that should be fair and reasonable.”78 
Manufacturers are also required to “consider” other good-will offers, like 
donating vaccines, transferring technology, and providing WHO with 
sublicenses for its intellectual property.79 
If a vaccine manufacturer wants to license its vaccine-related 
intellectual property to low- or middle-income countries (“LMICs”) under 
this agreement, it can do so in several ways. By one method, the 
manufacturer can contract directly with a developing country and receive 
royalties under mutual terms, as long as those terms are “fair and 
reasonable.”80 In determining what is fair and reasonable, the contracting 
parties are supposed to consider factors like the developing country’s 
technological advancement and already-held intellectual property rights in 
the vaccine field.81 Under the second option, the manufacturer can opt to 
grant licenses to LMICs or to WHO directly, who can then sublicense certain 
 
 73.  Id. at 30–31, art. 5.2–5.3. 
 74.  Id. at 31, art. 6.1. 
 75.  Id. at 31, art. 6.2–6.3. 
 76.  Id. at 33–36. 
 77.  Id. at 33–35. 
 78.  Id. at 34, art. 4.1.1(A). 
 79.  Id. at 35, art. 4.1.1(C). 
 80.  Id. at 34, art. 4.1.1(A5). 
 81.  Id. 
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vaccine-related technology to LMICs.82 In either case, manufacturers who 
choose to license their IP must report to WHO on how their license 
agreements are coming along.83 
In summary, the PIP Framework is important because it provides 
industries with an assurance that pandemic flu viruses will remain open 
access, and it gives donating countries the knowledge that when pandemics 
strike, WHO will be able to provide them with vaccines or relevant 
technology to fight back. 
III. TO EXTEND OR NOT TO EXTEND: THAT IS THE DEBATE 
The PIP Framework is currently undergoing a review, and in these 
review meetings, stakeholders have raised several issues with the GISRS 
system.84 One of these issues is that the PIP Framework only covers 
pandemic influenza85 even though seasonal influenza viruses are also 
donated to GISRS.86 Directly expanding the framework to cover seasonal 
influenza87 is one of three alternatives on the table; stakeholders have also 
 
 82.  Id. at 34, art. 4.1.1(A6). 
 83.  Id. at 34, art. 4.1.1 (“Where Option 5 or 6 is selected, the Recipient shall regularly provide to 
WHO information on granted licenses and the status of implementation of the licensing agreement. WHO 
shall provide such information to the Advisory Group.”). 
 84.  Catherine Saez, Review of WHO Pandemic Flu Preparedness: Data Sequencing And Other 
Issues, INT. PROP. WATCH (Mar. 31, 2016), http://www.ip-watch.org/2016/03/31/review-of-who-
pandemic-flu-preparedness-data-sequencing-and-other-issues/ [hereinafter Saez, Review of Pandemic 
Flu]. 
 85.  Id. 
 86.  WHO Global Influenza Surveillance and Response System (GISRS) Surveillance and Vaccine 
Development, supra note 55. It should be noted that seasonal influenza vaccine work is indirectly involved 
in GISRS and the PIP Framework.  For example, GISRS spending covers both pandemic and seasonal 
influenza laboratory research, and companies are required to donate money to GISRS that is proportionate 
to both pandemic and seasonal influenza “product sales.” IMPLEMENTATION OF DECISION 
WHA70(10)8(B) SCOPING PAPER ON APPROACHES TO SEASONAL INFLUENZA AND GENETIC SEQUENCE 
DATA UNDER THE PIP FRAMEWORK (“SCOPING PAPER”), WORLD HEALTH ORG. ¶ 24 (Oct. 2017), 
http://www.who.int/influenza/pip/scopingpaper.pdf [hereinafter SCOPING PAPER]. 
 87.  In theory, direct incorporation might be as simple as making three changes: first, the line “[t]his 
Framework does not apply to seasonal influenza” would need to be struck from the agreement; second, 
the definition of “[i]nfluenza virus with human pandemic potential” would need to include seasonal 
influenza viruses; and third, SMTA 2—the benefits sharing contract—would need to include a section 
where vaccine manufacturers chose to provide WHO with one of a list of seasonal flu vaccine benefits. 
See WHO, PIP FRAMEWORK Q&A, supra note 67, at 7, 9, 33–35. However, that section could 
theoretically be copied from the pandemic influenza benefits sharing section, by, for example, allowing 
companies to donate a fraction of their seasonal flu vaccines to LMICs. Id. at 33–35. The language of 
every other provision in the agreement could likely remain the same. In doing so, the entire PIP 
Framework would cover seasonal and pandemic influenza. However, if extension were chosen, 
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discussed the creation of a parallel agreement that covers seasonal influenza 
only and the allowance of seasonal influenza coverage under a separate 
international agreement called the Nagoya Protocol.88 In this paper, the term 
“framework expansion” will be used primarily to indicate direct expansion 
of the framework, but I do not oppose a parallel agreement or an 
interpretation of the Nagoya Protocol that would preserve benefit sharing 
and IP considerations inherent in the PIP Framework. 
The question of whether or not to expand benefit sharing and IP 
protection generally is being heavily debated: drafting language in an 
agreement is one thing, but implementing it is another, and there are many 
arguments for and against extension at WHO. On one side of the debate, 
WHO reviewers89 and the Gates Foundation have voiced support for research 
into Framework extension.90 On the other side, a variety of groups, including 
the pharmaceutical industry,91 the Third World Network,92 and GISAID,93 
have opposed extension. Still others, including a representative of WHO 
Collaborating Centre, once urged to look into the possibility with caution.94 
In this Part, I will discuss several arguments for and against extension and 
explain why the arguments in favor of extension are superior as a matter of 
innovation, economy, and public health.  
A. Industry Argument 1: Too Much Red Tape  
At the August 29, 2016 PIP Framework review meeting, a 
representative of pharmaceutical giant Sanofi Pasteur asked that the PIP 
 
stakeholders could, naturally, carve out a section in the new framework with exceptions and new 
requirements for seasonal influenza sharing specifically. 
 88.  SCOPING PAPER, supra note 86, at ¶ 26. 
 89.  PRELIMINARY FINDINGS, PIP FRAMEWORK REVIEW GROUP 2016, 3 (Aug. 19, 2016), 
http://www.who.int/influenza/pip/2016-review/pip_review_group_prelim_findings.pdf?ua=1 
(discussing framework expansion). 
 90.  Saez, Review of Pandemic Flu, supra note 84. 
 91.  Catherine Saez, WHO Debates Expansion of Role In Virus-Sharing, INT. PROP. WATCH (Aug. 
31, 2016), http://www.ip-watch.org/2016/08/31/who-debates-expansion-of-role-in-virus-sharing/ 
[hereinafter Saez, WHO Debates Role]. 
 92.  Saez, Review of Pandemic Flu, supra note 84. 
 93.  GISAID, GISAID’S COMMENTS ON THE PRELIMINARY FINDINGS OF THE PIP FRAMEWORK 
REVIEW GROUP 2016, 1 (2016). 
 94.  Saez, WHO Debates Role, supra note 91. But see The Inclusion of Seasonal Influenza Viruses 
and Genetic Sequence Data (GSD) in the Context of the Pandemic Influenza Preparedness (PIP) 
Framework, http://www.who.int/influenza/pip/CC_ERL_DirectorsPositionPaper_8b.pdf (last visited 
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Framework not be extended to seasonal flu because extension could 
“[require] obligation[s] that ha[d] already been committed by the third 
parties . . . for example industry, . . . to be revised . . . [and] add another layer 
of . . . complexity.”95 Another industry representative agreed with those 
assertions without providing much added detail.96 However, at one point 
during her comments, she did state her group’s belief that “the 
contribution[s] provided the industry . . . ha[d] been sufficient.”97 Others 
have noted that companies already provide funding to GISRS based in part 
on seasonal flu vaccine sales.98 
These comments seem to suggest that manufacturers view the PIP 
Framework generally as a burden and an extension of that burden as 
unreasonable. This suggestion is made stronger by the fact that, even under 
the current PIP Framework, very few manufacturers have even signed onto 
the SMTA 2 provisions.99 The reasons for this sentiment, of course, are 
understandable: being asked to donate ten percent of a vaccine supply to 
WHO during a pandemic, transfer technology to a developing nation, or 
produce low-cost intellectual property licensing agreements, for example, 
are not small financial or logistical matters.  
Although the red tape concerns of industry are certainly understandable, 
expanding the PIP Framework to include seasonal influenza could lower 
some very thick red tape in the long run. Generally speaking, seasonal 
influenza patenting is already something of a free-for-all:100 a situation that 
can lead to patent thickets,101 tight control over virus-related material (and, 
consequently, the vaccines that are made of viral material) by certain 
corporations, and expensive licensing agreements that hinder competition. 
 
 95.  Saez, WHO Debates Role, supra note 91; 2016 Review of the PIP Framework Webcast, WORLD 
HEALTH ORG. (Aug. 29, 2016), http://who.int/influenza/pip/2016-review/webcasts/en/ [hereinafter 
WHO, 2016 Review Webcast] (starting at minute 46:52). 
 96.  WHO, 2016 Review Webcast, supra note 95, at 53:20. 
 97.  Id. at 49:32. 
 98.  See SCOPING PAPER, supra note 86, at 5. 
 99.  WHO, 2016 Review Webcast, supra note 95, at 1:17:28. 
 100.  This kind of situation has happened before. Antonio Regalado, Scientists’ Hunt for SARS Cure 
Turns to Race for Patent Rights, WALL ST. J., http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB105209016979730900 
(last updated May 5, 2003, 3:41 PM). 
 101.  See generally Dana Beldiman, Patent Choke Points in the Influenza-Related Medicines 
Industry: Can Patent Pools Provide Balanced Access?, 15 TUL. J. TECH. & INT. PROP. 31 (2012). This 
article is particularly interesting because it criticizes the current framework for not protecting IP rights 
enough. See id. generally. However, in this article, I suggest that minimum protections for seasonal flu 
are better than nothing, which is the current standard. 
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According to Martin Friede, who leads WHO’s Technology Transfer 
Initiative,102 about 10,000 patent applications have been filed for vaccines in 
the past two decades, and many patent-holding entities want royalties from 
manufacturers.103 And, as Dana Beldiman explains, “[d]epending on the 
density of the thicket (number of patents to be licensed, economic and 
political dynamics among the players, etc.) it is possible that none of the 
players [in influenza medicine manufacturing] will be able to assemble all 
the requisite rights to a product.”104 
The PIP Framework’s prohibition on patenting donated material may 
appear to cover only a small piece of the potential thicket pie. However, this 
kind of prohibition is an important check on the unleashing of epidemics.105 
All it takes is for one country, like Indonesia in 2007, to give one of its own 
manufacturers exclusive rights to develop a vaccine on a virus. Or for a 
country, like China in 2002, to keep a virus a complete secret from the world 
until the virus spreads to neighboring countries.106 Or for researchers, like 
several in Canada in 2003, to try to patent a virus and consider charging 
royalties downstream.107  
Although none of these historical events led to public health 
catastrophes, and seasonal flu strains can mutate quickly, it would be unwise 
for us to push our luck in the future by allowing patent ownership of material 
closely linked to donated seasonal viruses by WHO-affiliated laboratories. 
If the PIP Framework is not extended to seasonal flu, the seasonal flu vaccine 
world could be primed for further patent thicketing, vaccine monopolization, 
and industry stifling and put a chokehold on seasonal vaccine development.  
 
 102.  Catherine Saez, Access to Vaccines, Patents Growing Concerns, Panelists Say, INT. PROP. 
WATCH (Oct. 6, 2014), http://www.ip-watch.org/2014/06/10/access-to-vaccines-patents-growing-
concerns-panellists-say/ [hereinafter Saez, Access to Vaccines]. 
 103.  Id. 
 104.  See Beldiman, supra note 102, at 47 (emphasis added). 
 105.  A technical paper from the Life Sciences Program at the World Intellectual Property 
Organization voiced a similar concern about pandemic flu before PIP Framework extensions were 
extended to it. See WORKING PAPER: PATENT ISSUES RELATED TO INFLUENZA VIRUSES AND THEIR GENES, 
LIFE SCIENCES PROGRAM, WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ORG. 1, 4 (2007), 
http://www.wipo.int/export/sites/www/policy/en/global_health/pdf/influenza.pdf (“Relatively few 
patents or patent applications claim bare H5N1 genetic material as such, although some cases exist and 
may require closer examination, since they could constrain wider downstream usage of the genetic 
material claimed, such as in the development of new vaccines or production of vaccines.”). 
 106.  Holbrooke & Garrett, supra note 59 (referring to the SARS virus). 
 107.  Regalado, supra note 100. 
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Extending the PIP Framework as a whole to seasonal influenza might 
create red tape for industry, building a network of non-patentable seasonal 
flu viruses through PIP Framework extension might be worth the extra 
hassle.  
B. Industry Argument 2: Extension Incentivizes ‘Handout’ 
Culture for Seasonal Flu Preparedness 
Among some companies, there may be a sentiment that LMICs simply 
need to develop their own vaccines108 rather than rely on free seasonal flu 
vaccines or technology transfer from SMTA 2 agreements. As of 2002, 
fourteen companies on a WHO task force were producing 90% of the world’s 
flu vaccines,109 and many large pharmaceutical companies are located in 
higher-income nations.110 Disparities in research and development mirror 
geographic disparities in wealth: “companies [in high-income countries] 
devote between 15 and 20 percent of their profit to R&D, [while those in 
lower-income countries devote] 2 or 3 percent.”111 
The sentiment that manufacturers in developed countries dislike sharing 
seasonal flu resources with LMICs is suggested by the fact that companies 
that have signed SMTA agreements have already been reluctant to 
participate in developing country tech transfer for pandemic flu.112 Although 
this reluctance may stem from a number of factors, such as feasibility 
concerns, companies likely also fear the loss of their patented inventions or 
trade secrets113 to groups that have not put in the work to develop them on 
their own. 
It is unknown how many vaccine manufacturers are opposed to PIP 
Framework expansion on the ground that they already feel they are doing 
 
 108.  Id. 
 109.  VACCINES FOR PANDEMIC INFLUENZA, WORLD HEALTH ORG. 9 (Nov. 12, 2004), 
http://www.who.int/influenza/resources/documents/WHO_CDS_CSR_GIP_2004_3.pdf. 
 110.  Id. at 14–16. 
 111.  Saez, Access to Vaccines, supra note 102. 
 112.  PIP FRAMEWORK REVIEW GROUP 2016, WORLD HEALTH ORG. 7 (Aug. 19, 2016), 
http://www.ip-watch.org/weblog/wp-content/uploads/2016/08/PIP-Review-Group-Preliminary-
Findings-August-2016.pdf. 
 113.  Id.; Methodological and Technological Issues in Technology Transfer, INTERGOVERNMENTAL 
PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, http://www.ipcc.ch/ipccreports/sres/tectran/index.php?idp=202 (last 
visited Feb. 16, 2018) (“A major requirement for successful agreement in technology transfer is the 
guarantee of intellectual property rights (IPR). Without an IPR law that is effectively enforced, there is 
little incentive for private companies to share their technology.”). 
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more than their fair share. However, this argument, however justified, 
appears to suggest that those in LMICs are simply lazy. Although nations 
have difficulty developing their own vaccine networks for many reasons, 
none of those are reasons why they should be ignored. To a much greater 
extent than wealthier countries, for example, LMICs are constantly trying to 
combat ubiquitous poverty, severe illness, poor educational systems, 
sustainable resource issues, and unstable or unsafe social and political 
climates.114 If anything, the fact that developing nations have bigger fish to 
fry than seasonal influenza should morally compel companies in wealthier 
nations to share seasonal influenza vaccine benefits.  
However, if that rationale isn’t enough to persuade a company to 
expand benefits sharing to seasonal influenza, the business potential of 
investing in developing companies should. Stanley Plotkin explains that the 
vaccine industry is in danger, presumably due to high costs of production 
and patent thicketing, and notes that “fewer companies are developing 
vaccines.”115 One thing that smaller members of the vaccine industry could 
hypothetically do to survive is develop global partnerships through mutual, 
low-cost licensing and sharing of technology, and the SMTA 2 agreement 
facilitates these kinds of deals for pandemic flu. Extending that framework 
to seasonal flu could help the industry become more collaborative and 
profitable overall by creating stronger international benefits-sharing 
networks. 
C. Industry Argument 3: We Want Our Patents 
A related problem that industry might have with extending the 
Framework is that extension would limit industry’s ability to patent seasonal 
viruses.116 This would be less of an argument for manufacturers than for 
 
 114. Many of these issues are directly discussed in the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. 
Resolution Adopted by the General Assembly on 25 September 2015, UNITED NATIONS, A/RES/70/1, 14 
(Oct. 21, 2015), http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/70/1&Lang=E. 
 115.  Saez, Access to Vaccines, supra note 102 (quoting Saez in her discussion of Plotkin’s 
commentary). 
 116.  The literature has not focused much on this specific issue, perhaps because WHO-participating 
labs have not done much patenting in this arena in the past, there is little research on current patenting 
behavior, or it has been hard to trace such activity. See generally Amy Kapczynski, Order Without 
Intellectual Property Law: Open Science in Influenza, 102 CORNELL L. REV. 1539, 1618–20 (2017). 
However, outside laws or agreements notwithstanding, if seasonal influenza were under the PIP 
Agreement, SMTA 1’s non-patenting standards would apply to it. This issue has been discussed in 
relation to genetic sequence data, however, which could be used to develop vaccines generally. See, e.g., 
IMPLEMENTATION OF DECISION WHA70(10) 8(B) EVIDENCE FOR “SCOPING PAPER ON APPROACHES TO 
 
  
2018 AN ARGUMENT IN FAVOR OF WHO PIP FRAMEWORK EXPANSION 315 
 
WHO-participating research laboratories, because only laboratories sign the 
intellectual property agreement that restricts viral patenting.117  
The notion that a virus can be patented may seem odd for some readers, 
but it is, in fact, an option in many countries.118 The patentability of viruses 
in the United States has recently come under debate, but in certain ways, 
virus-related material has been patentable for years in our country119 and in 
others.120 Dana Beldiman explains that some courts “have viewed isolated 
genes as [distinct] from what exists in nature and considered them patent 
eligible. Other jurisdictions view isolated genes as patentable even if they 
are similar to what exists in nature, albeit only if a specific useful function 
can be articulated.”121  
Patenting viral material helps industries to safeguard their own research 
and increase their profits by, for example, licensing out their products for a 
fee.122 And in the case of seasonal influenza, where manufacturers may work 
with only slightly different virus strains each year, holding broad patents on 
virus-related material could protect research even as viruses change.123 The 
 
SEASONAL INFLUENZA AND GENETIC SEQUENCE DATA UNDER THE PIP FRAMEWORK” (“SCOPING PAPER”) 
A17 (2017), http://www.who.int/influenza/pip/seasonalcompilation.pdf?ua=1 [hereinafter EVIDENCE 
FOR SCOPING PAPER]. 
 117.  See supra Section III.B. 
 118.  See Andre Mayer, Can You Patent a Disease?, CBC NEWS, 
http://www.cbc.ca/news/health/can-you-patent-a-disease-1.1355379 (last updated June 12, 2013). 
 119.  The United States, for example, holds a patent on the Ebola Virus. See Human Ebola Virus 
Species and Compositions and Methods Thereof, U.S. Patent No. 2012/0251502 A1 (issued Oct. 4, 2012). 
 120.  Claudio Chiarolla, Intellectual Property Rights and Benefit Sharing from Marine Genetic 
Resources in Areas Beyond National Jurisdiction: Current Discussions and Regulatory Options, 4 
QUEEN MARY J. INTELL. PROP. 171, 176–77 (2014). (“In the United States, three categories of inventions 
are non-patentable: laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas [based on the ‘Product of nature 
doctrine’]. The boundaries of such doctrine are routinely tested in disputes that concern the patentability 
of DNA and its alleged positive or stifling effects on biological innovation. In addition to the United 
States, Australia, Canada, Indonesia, Japan, Singapore and the 18 Member States of the African Regional 
Intellectual Property Organization generally allow full patentability of animals, plants and biological 
processes without particular restrictions.”) 
 121.  Beldiman, supra note 101, at 41. 
 122.  Scientists Race to Patent SARS Virus, NBC NEWS (last updated Nov. 4, 2003), 
http://www.nbcnews.com/id/3076748/ns/health-infectious_diseases/t/scientists-race-patent-sars-
virus/#.WC0OjfkrKM8. 
 123.  See EDWARD HAMMOND, SOME INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ISSUES RELATED TO H5N1 
INFLUENZA VIRUSES, RESEARCH, AND VACCINES, THIRD WORLD NETWORK 1, 8 (2009), 
https://www.twn.my/title2/IPR/pdf/ipr12.pdf ("The changeable nature of influenza has led some research 
groups, including at least one major company (Merck), to seek new influenza vaccines that do not rely 
on particular HA or NA sequences. Others have laid claim to sequences and any other sequence that is 
similar, for example, 90% or more of the same. At least one other has responded by attempting to patent 
large numbers of varying HA and NA genes.”). 
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only problem with this, of course, is that the bonuses of virus patenting do 
not go to industry collectively but to the companies with the power to patent 
their inventions the quickest. As flu viruses, vaccines, and other technologies 
become patented more frequently, patent thickets can emerge,124 making it 
harder for small vaccine manufacturers to acquire all of the licenses 
necessary to produce their own vaccines.125 Extending the PIP Framework 
to seasonal flu, on the other hand, will create an open network of unpatented 
seasonal flu viruses that will facilitate global flu research among all 
manufacturers: not just the biggest corporations. 
D. Public Health Argument 1: Unraveling Progress 
One concern raised by a nonprofit organization called the Third World 
Network was that expanding the PIP Framework to include seasonal 
influenza would potentially undo WHO’s progress by requiring an overhaul 
of the Framework itself.126 This concern was partially echoed by GISAID in 
a 2016 PIP Framework commentary: 
 
It should be remembered that agreement to the PIP 
[Framework] was only possible by the exclusion of 
seasonal influenza viruses, given the likely complications 
and potential disadvantages [it would have created for] the 
well-established operational GISRS sharing and benefit 
system, and [the confusion it would have caused] between 
epidemic seasonal influenza and the special health 
emergency of an influenza pandemic.127 
 
These comments suggest that there is general concern about expanding 
the Framework, whether because there is a fear that parties will not agree to 
 
 124.  Beldiman, supra note 101, at 35 (“[Patent thickets] result in a suboptimal functioning of the 
patent system and exacerbate the natural process of narrowing of the number of players who place product 
on the market. The end effect may be a single-player or even a no-player scenario at the commercialization 
stage, a result that cannot support the Framework’s availability and affordability objectives.”). 
 125.  See id. at 48. 
 126.  WHO, 2016 Review Webcast, supra note 95, at 1:03:45. 
 127.  GISAID’S COMMENTS ON THE PRELIMINARY FINDINGS OF THE PIP FRAMEWORK REVIEW 
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it or because changing the Framework could be difficult. These concerns, 
however, seem to be speculative. The United States and Australia, for 
example, have expressed openness to framework expansion discussion.128 
Notably, there is a concern that laboratories would deal with significant 
additional paperwork and tracking issues under an expanded Framework,129 
but WHO partners can certainly look into building local GISRS tracking 
infrastructure or crafting the extension in a way that makes tracking easier 
or less cumbersome for seasonal flu strains than for pandemic flu.130  
E. Public Health Argument 2: Not Strong Enough for the 
Nagoya Protocol 
The Nagoya Protocol is an international agreement adopted in 2010 that 
commits countries to share genetic resources in a manner that promotes 
access equity.131 It is unclear whether the PIP Framework might exempt 
pandemic flu genetic material from the requirements of the Nagoya 
Protocol.132 An industry representative at the August 2016 PIP Framework 
meeting brought forth an argument against Framework expansion that was 
connected to the Nagoya Protocol. She explained,  
 
we do not think that including seasonal influenza into the 
PIP Framework will solve the issue of [the] Nagoya 
Protocol. First of all, it’s . . . [a] voluntary framework, so it 
probably will not provide the legal certainty that might be 
needed. Second of all, WHO GISRS could be elevated itself 
to provide some level of certainty.133 
 
This sentiment has been echoed elsewhere, and to some groups, the 
question of the Nagoya Protocol is the main issue to consider in deciding 
 
 128.  See EVIDENCE FOR SCOPING PAPER, supra note 116, at 8. Note that Norway, and potentially 
other countries, appear to oppose PIP Framework expansion, although it is unclear whether this opinion 
might change if the Framework were expanded in a way that would not overload GISRS. See id. at 8. 
 129.  SCOPING PAPER, supra note 86, at 7. 
 130.  See WHO, 2016 Review Webcast, supra note 95, at 1:04:22 (presenting a similar idea). 
 131.  About the Nagoya Protocol, CONVENTION ON BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY, 
https://www.cbd.int/abs/about/#objective (last visited Nov. 16, 2016). 
 132.  SCOPING PAPER, supra note 86, at ¶¶ 18–19. 
 133.  WHO, 2016 Review Webcast, supra note 95, at 53:19. 
 
  
318 CHICAGO-KENT JOURNAL OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY Vol 17:2 
 
whether or not to extend the PIP Framework to cover seasonal influenza.134 
The idea that the PIP Framework could do more to approach the standards 
of the Nagoya Protocol and generally explain the roles of participating 
entities more clearly is certainly true. For example, the intellectual property 
protections that the PIP Framework provides have been considered 
ambiguous in recent scholarship,135 and those protections could be clarified 
and strengthened.  
However, strengthening the Framework to match the demands of the 
Nagoya Protocol is a different (albeit related) issue than that of expanding 
the Framework to include seasonal influenza. Perhaps the PIP Framework 
can be simultaneously strengthened and extended to seasonal influenza. In 
so doing, countries would not feel confused about which standards—the 
Nagoya Protocol’s or the PIP Framework’s—would need to be followed in 
donating different kinds of viral flu material to GISRS.136 
F. The Marketing Argument: LMICs Don’t Care.  
One of the other arguments brought up at the August 2016 meeting 
against expanding the seasonal influenza framework was that “[i]n some 
regions, there is really no demand” for seasonal flu vaccines.137 This 
argument was echoed by Adam Kamradt-Scott and Kelley Lee, who 
explained that major pharmaceutical companies are often located in wealthy 
countries because LMICs are focused on more pressing illnesses than 
seasonal flu and lack the money to purchase vaccines.138 
In all practicality, though, as long as seasonal influenza kills vulnerable 
populations around the globe, there will be a potential market for seasonal 
influenza vaccines. And in countries like Madagascar, where a 2002 seasonal 
flu epidemic “had a case-fatality rate of 3% as compared to <0.1% in other 
influenza pandemics,” and the Congo, where an influenza outbreak had an 
 
 134.  See, e.g., SEASONAL INFLUENZA COMMENTS, supra note 94, at 1, 3. 
 135.  See Beldiman, supra note 101, at 40 (“The meaning of the term ‘materials’ in [SMTA 1] is 
ambiguous: Does the prohibition against obtaining IP rights merely cover the sample’s physical layer or 
does it extend to its informational layer, including its DNA structure?”). 
 136.  See EVIDENCE FOR SCOPING PAPER, supra note 116, at S15.  
 137.  WHO, 2016 Review Webcast, supra note 95, at 47:53 (stated by an industry representative). 
 138.  Adam Kamradt-Scott & Kelley Lee, The 2011 Pandemic Influenza Preparedness Framework: 
Global Health Secured or a Missed Opportunity?, 59 POLIT. STUD. 831, 836–37 (2011). 
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even higher case-fatality rate among children under five years old, that 
market condition is clearly being met.139  
Therefore, if the market demand appears to be low, it is not due to a 
lack of need but likely due to other problems, like a lack of awareness about 
the benefits of the flu shot or insufficient funds to pay for one. The first can 
be corrected through public health education, and the second by marketing 
the vaccine at affordable rates. If WHO partners make an effort to educate 
the public in developing nations about seasonal flu vaccines and find a way 
to bring seasonal vaccines to them at prices they can afford, the public will 
likely respond. In fact, as WHO notes, “an increasing number of low and 
middle income countries situated in the tropics and subtropics have 
considered introducing or expanding seasonal influenza vaccination in their 
national immunization program.”140 And because the PIP Framework 
essentially eliminates licensing fees tied to basic viral applications141 and 
allows industry to contribute benefits to LMICs in a variety of ways, it should 
be possible for industry to help find creative ways to provide vaccines in 
these areas  that are more reasonably priced.  
In short, it is true that the PIP Framework is primarily a public health 
tool for promoting fair and sustainable trading among nations. However, as 
previously noted, a program that promotes global health also promotes 
global economy, trade, and stability by extension. By expanding the PIP 
Framework to include seasonal influenza, adjustments will definitely be 
required. However, if negotiated appropriately, this effort could go a long 
way toward improving the global vaccine industry, global health, and the 
economy overall. Based on the arguments that have been discussed here, 
WHO should consider extending the PIP Framework to include seasonal 
influenza. 
IV. FURTHER CONSIDERATIONS 
The question of whether or not to extend the PIP Framework to include 
seasonal influenza is a simple one, in the sense that it will eventually be 
resolved through a “yes/no” answer. However, in answering that question, 
WHO will find itself asking others, such as: “How do we extend the 
 
 139.  Africa Flu Alliance, WORLD HEALTH ORG., 
http://www.who.int/influenza/preparedness/africa_flu/en/ (last visited Feb. 28, 2018). 
 140.  Influenza Vaccine in Tropics and Subtropics, WORLD HEALTH ORG., 
http://www.who.int/influenza/vaccines/tropics/en/ (last visited Feb. 23, 2018). 
 141.  See generally Beldiman, supra note 101, at 34. 
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Framework?” “Should the Framework’s intellectual property protections be 
improved generally?” And, “What is our philosophy moving forward on the 
role of public health in international vaccine policy?” In this section, I will 
briefly address each of these questions. 
First, in extending the Framework, WHO would have some flexibility 
in implementation: it could extend the PIP Framework itself or develop a 
linked Framework just for seasonal influenza, it could add many seasonal flu 
benefits sharing options to SMTA 2 or just a few, and it could choose 
whether to implement the Framework’s changes all at once, in stages, or 
through a pilot program.142 
Second, while considering Framework extension, WHO will likely 
consider strengthening and clarifying its IP protections as a whole. Dana 
Beldiman has, for example, suggested creating patent pool systems within 
the WHO network that cover vaccine-related technologies to prevent further 
patent thickets from forming.143 Alternatively, an industry representative has 
suggested building “certainty” into the Framework,144 and this could be done 
in part by making the IP neutrality provision of the PIP Framework more 
concrete.145 For example, the agreement could specify whether or to what 
extent variations or derivatives of viral material can be patented by WHO 
laboratories under SMTA 1. The discussion of how WHO should specifically 
build upon its current IP framework is beyond the scope of this paper. 
However, in general, if WHO does decide to move forward with PIP 
Framework extension, it should consider extension an opportunity to make 
the current flu virus sharing network more open and collaborative as a whole. 
Third, in moving forward, WHO will need to reconsider its view on the 
role that public health plays in vaccine agreements. The stakeholders that 
WHO has worked with during this process have represented the needs of 
business, research, and public health. However, the interests of these 
stakeholders have frequently clashed in discussions. Obviously, WHO 
cannot afford to ignore or discount any of these perspectives. However, 
WHO, as an institution dedicated to public health, might do well to frame 
future efforts in the IP arena as a promotion of long-term international 
economic growth by promoting international health and well-being. 
 
 142.  See WHO, 2016 Review Webcast, supra note 95, at 1:04:22 (a few of these ideas are expressed). 
 143.  See id.; Beldiman, supra note 101, at 54–61. 
 144.  WHO, 2016 Review Webcast, supra note 95, at 53:37. 
 145.  See Beldiman, supra note 101, at 40. 
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CONCLUSION 
Intellectual property can be used as a tool to further important public 
health and business goals simultaneously, especially in the global virus-
sharing context. Seasonal influenza is a pervasive public health problem that 
can have far-reaching effects on human life and on the economy. However, 
laboratories within WHO can currently patent seasonal flu viruses, which 
can create dangerous monopolies and roadblocks in vaccine research and 
development. Protecting the open access nature of seasonal flu virus sharing 
and providing seasonal flu donor countries with seasonal flu products, 
licenses, and technologies can boost industry and protect global health. 
WHO should consider not only extending the PIP Framework to seasonal flu 
but also making its provisions stronger. 
 
